Iraq – Is There Hope?

Do we as a country have the fortitude to come away from the Iraq war with a victory? With all the bad news being circulated by the news media is it even possible to achieve a victory? Read the following article to get a whole different perspective on the situation.

By Robert E. Freer, Jr., President of The Free Enterprise Foundation

Back in 2003, writing the first of what is now almost a half dozen articles on the war in Iraq; I noted that although the allies had superior force of arms to prevail, the real question was whether the alliance will have… “The fortitude to persist…to set the seeds for a new political stability in the Middle East. Fortitude in the aftermath of battle will provide a better life for millions of Muslims and Jews alike and leave the rest of the world a safer place.”

I have returned to that theme several times in the intervening years and believe “fortitude” is still the ultimate question. Right now it isn’t looking real good for “fortitude.” The mainstream press would have you believe that the prospects for success are dim and getting dimmer, that little in the way of civil sector improvement has been accomplished, and our military is being sacrificed for no good reason.

Admittedly our past errors have dug a hole upon which the press has composed their defeatist dirge, but in fact there are signs of progress that General Petraeus and his Princeton brain trust can build on. 47 countries have re-established their embassies, the Iraqi military leadership battalions are coming on stream as promised, and, recently in a joint operation, the Deputy Secretary of the Health Ministry was arrested for embezzlement of government funds diverted to the Mahdi Militia. This is an important demonstration that the previous protection for Shia members of the government connected to the various militias is no longer in existence. The Iraqi Air Force and Navy are operational as well, and there is hope that armored vehicles, communication equipment and sufficient arms for them to prevail will soon be forthcoming.

With 55,000 trained police officers, Iraq’s 5 police academies are turning out 3500 new officers every 8 weeks. 96% of Iraqis under age 5 have received the first 2 series of polio vaccinations and 4.3 million Iraqi children are enrolled in primary school. The civil rebuilding program is going ahead full steam despite the everyday acts of terror. There are more than 1100 building projects including 364 schools, 67 public clinics, 15 hospitals, 83 railroad stations, 22 oil facilities 93 water facilities and 69 electrical facilities and the trend is accelerating not diminishing in the face of the sectarian violence. With determination to win, the war is at a tipping point where it could go either way, but in Washington you couldn’t get a plugged nickel for a bet we will see it through to victory.

While there is hope in Baghdad, in Washington the pressure of a superheated early campaign for president and the partisan blame game virtually assure that some action to lower our exposure before 2008 will be forthcoming. How did a campaign begun in such promise end up this way? It didn’t have to. The anger and angst we feel today is a result of strategic and tactical miscalculation by the Administration that has fueled a political firestorm. The issue is now “competence of the war’s managers,” not WMD and certainly not political doctrine. Regrettably all of us including those living in the Mediterranean Basin will pay for our mistakes.

General Powell is looking increasingly Delphic in his “Pottery Barn” pronouncement that, if we break it, we own it. Well, we do own it. It is now our mess not just this president’s or the Republican Party’s. Powell’s first corollary is not to attack until you can do so in overwhelming force. We were at least 200,000 soldiers short of the force needed to keep control of the ground once it was occupied. To compound our error, once we made it to Baghdad, we sent the old Iraqi Army which, in its lower ranks, was just as much a victim of Sadham, home without purpose, training of any kind and without assets to do anything but cause mayhem.

While praying for our troops and their commander on the ground to overcome the obstacles that confront them, and praying for us here at home for our failure of will and intellect, I feel sure the Administration is quietly planning for “Plan B” in case progress on the ground is not visible by early fall at the latest. What might that be like?

John Chipman, Director General of the International institute for Strategic Studies, (IISS) recently noted that “Great power relations are in a state of flux due to the US not being strong enough to enforce the international agenda it seeks to impose.” You can read that as meaning that the interests of peace and global trade have been set back and global intrigue increased. Mr. Chipman went on to suggest, “US power is strong enough to establish an agenda for international activity, but is too weak effectively to implement that agenda globally.” Conversely, he states, “the power of others, whether states or sub-state actors is strong enough to resist an American agenda, but too weak to shape an internationally attractive alternative or to implement an enduring local agenda free of outside influence.” Mr. Chipman is pessimistic that the troop increase in Baghdad will accomplish its goals, noting that level is well below the new U.S. Army and Marines field manual recommendation of 50 per 1,000 for counter insurgency.

Any “Plan B” needs to start with an increase in authorized permanent troop strength. I suspect existing ceilings and manpower mission limitations had a real hand in the initial mistake that put us in the fix we are in. The President has already requested a permanent increase in the Army and Marines of 92,000. Using the aforesaid manual as a guide and considering the number of National Guard units called up for second tours and regular units extended for second and third tours, I doubt if that is enough for an Iraqi sized problem that might confront us in the future. Whatever the figure is for Plan B, it needs to include prolonged assignment of civil affairs units once the area has been pacified, and these units need enhanced language and cultural training to work effectively in those areas thought to be high risk.

The authorized strength ought to substantially increase special operations troops (our spear point) and the logistics to get them anywhere we need quickly. This “bookends” approach with highly trained special operations troops in sufficient number ready to go, regular troops in sufficient force to sustain its operations and pacify and civil affairs units to speed reconstruction and the creation of local government responsive to local needs, gives us the highest likelihood of a credible force required to meet the shifting needs of today’s battlefield. It also gives us third world credibility sufficient to be an inhibiting factor against terrorism at home or abroad.

As our forces prepare to withdraw from Iraq, we will need to retain an appropriate level of force credibility. Troops in effective unit mass will need to remain in the vicinity. Whether we are talking Qatar, Kuwait, Kazakhstan or shipboard in the Indian Ocean, I am not enough of an expert to judge, but suspect that some mix consistent with force needs and regional politics will drive the answer. To facilitate our troop withdrawal from Iraq, there will need to be a mission change from suppressing the conflict in Baghdad to training and border control that will minimize our weakened force strength and leave the heavy lifting to Iraqis. There is an argument that at some stage of the conflict (critics say we are past this point), our troops become the destabilizing force and should be removed to force the political solution we seek. Effective border security would be just the mission to allow us to depart in an orderly fashion as the cities are pacified by Iraqis.

The issue of how many of our troops remain, I leave for a later day when we will know better the situation in Iraq. The ultimate outcome here has always depended on the Iraqi people. The Sunni bloodbath of Shia following our withdrawal after the first Iraqi War and this war of mutual destruction can only be solved by the contending parties. We can only do the best we can to contain its harmful effects in the region and for our economy. For the future, may I suggest that we mimic Theodore Roosevelt who opined that the policy that was best required the United States to talk softly and carry a big stick.

Copyright © 2007 by Robert E. Freer, Jr. All rights reserved

About the author: Robert E. Freer, Jr. is President of The Free Enterprise Foundation. He is a Visiting Professor, at The Citadel and elected in 2005 to be their first John S. Grinalds Leader in Residence. A regular contributor to the Mercury, He can be reached by E-mail at The Citadel . Copies of his earlier columns can be found The Free Enterprise Foundation.

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